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1. M. Adhikari, ‘Hope, Fear, Shame, Frustration: Continuity and Change in the Expression of
Coloured Identity in White Supremacist South Africa, 1910-1994’ (PhD thesis, University of
Cape Town, 2002). The central argument of the dissertation is that Coloured identity is better
understood not as having evolved through a series of transformations during this period, as
conventional historical thinking would have it, but to have remained surprisingbly stable
throughout the era of white rule. This is not to contend that Coloured identity was static or that
it lacked fluidity, but that the continuities during this period were more fundamental to the way
in which it operated as a social identity than the changes it experienced. It is argued at some
length that this stability was derived from a central core of enduring characteristics that regulated
the way in which Colouredness functioned as an identity during this period. For the core of the
argument, see especially pp. 7-8 and 24-43.
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I have argued elsewhere at great length that Coloured identity was remarkably
stable and experienced relatively little fundamental change in the way it functioned
as a social identity throughout that period of white supremacist rule from the
formation of the South African state through to the ending of apartheid.1
Expressions of Coloured identity have, in contrast, undergone rapid transformation
in the post-apartheid environment. The past decade has been a time of flux and
unprecedented change in the way Colouredness has operated, and indeed, has
needed to operate as a social identity. Not only has the new democratic dispensa-
tion brought with it a degree of freedom of association and possibilities for ethnic
mobilisation inconceivable under white domination, but it has also undermined,
even invalidated, some of the most basic assumptions and practices that had
underpinned Coloured identity from the time it had crystallised in the late
nineteenth century. And with the racial hierarchy that had regulated social
relations in white-ruled South Africa having broken down in important respects,
intergroup relations have become more complex and expressions of social identity
more fluid. While this has, on the one hand, compounded the confusion and
controversy that have dogged the identity in recent decades, it has also opened up
opportunities for new ways of conceptualising Colouredness and brought forth
more varied and creative responses to questions about the nature of Coloured
identity and its role in South African society. It is thus not surprising that the new
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political paradigm and ongoing swift social transformation have stimulated
innovative attempts at marshalling Coloured ethnic resources. This article seeks
to explain why Coloured identity, given its prior history of relative stability, has
experienced rapid and, in some respects, thorough-going change in the past decade
and to explore new social and political dynamics informing these shifts.
Despite the emergence of a vocal, Coloured rejectionist voice within the non-
racial democratic movement of the 1980s, the past decade and a half has witnessed
a resurgence of Colouredism with many people who had rejected the identity re-
embracing it. Fear of African majority rule, perceptions that Coloureds were being
marginalised, a desire to counter pervasive negative stereotyping of Coloured
people, and attempts at capitalising on the newly democratic environment in
pursuit of political agendas have all played a role in fuelling Coloured assertive-
ness in the new South Africa.2 It has become commonplace for Coloured people
disaffected with the new South Africa to express their disgruntlement by lamenting
that ‘first we were not white enough and now we are not black enough’. This
claim has very rapidly become clichèd, because it reflects popular sentiment within
the greater part of the Coloured community and highlights key dilemmas Coloured
people face in coming to grips with the post-apartheid environment. Besides
accentuating their interstitial position within a transforming South African racial
hierarchy, it very neatly captures their perennial predicament of marginality.
Though for many Coloured people the adage ‘the more things change, the more
they stay the same’ rings true regarding their position in the new South Africa, few
will deny that their lives have been profoundly affected by the changes of the last
decade. While the responses of the majority are still informed by apartheid-style
thinking, elements within the Coloured community have nevertheless been creative
about the manner in which they express their social identity.
The most obvious reason expressions of Coloured identity have experienced
swift innovation in post-apartheid South Africa is that change was forced upon it
because the political environment altered suddenly and drastically after F.W. de
Klerk’s landmark speech of 2 February 1990. A radical re-ordering of the political
landscape during the transition to democracy compelled re-assessment of
allegiances and re-alignment of priorities throughout South African society.
Continued rapid social and economic transformation has ensured a fluid milieu
conducive to the remoulding of all social identities, not least Coloured identity. 
Importantly in the case of Coloured identity, political reform brought with
it a significant increase in the political influence of the Coloured community which
heightened the salience of the identity. Democratic government, for the first time,
gave the Coloured community voting power commensurate with its demographic
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profile. This influence came into play well before 1994 in that, soon after the
unbanning of the African National Congress (ANC), leaders and organisations
across the political spectrum began lobbying with increasing urgency for support
within the Coloured community, in anticipation of the need to strengthen their
hands in negotiations and in expectation of having to mobilise for forthcoming
elections. Because of their concentration in the western third of the country where
they formed a majority of the population, it was clear to all from the start of
negotiations for a new dispensation that Coloured support was essential to political
success in those areas that were later to become the provinces of the Western and
Northern Cape.3 Nelson Mandela’s urging of the ANC in 1992 to recognise
‘Coloured ethnicity’ as a political reality was an important step in the public
acknowledgement of the existence of Coloured identity by the radical left.4 These
appeals to Coloured group consciousness had the effect of reinforcing Coloured
exclusivity because they contributed to the reification of Coloured identity,
undermined the non-racial stance of the rejectionist movement that had developed
during the 1970s and 1980s, and promoted the expression of political interests
along racial lines. Strenuous attempts to win the Coloured vote and hand-wringing
responses to Coloured voting patterns have subsequently served only to accentuate
Coloured exceptionalism and reify the identity further.
Although the use of overtly racialised political tactics have tended to
ameliorate during the last decade and most political parties in the new South
Africa claim to be non-racial, they are more accurately described as being multi-
racial in that they work with essentialist concepts of race and often openly try to
exploit racial identifications. The black-peril tactics of the National Party during
the 1990s, particularly in the run-up to the 1994 elections, were undoubtedly
instrumental in heightening race consciousness within the Coloured community.
More recently, Democratic Alliance strategies for winning Coloured support have
openly played upon their fears of African domination. The ANC clearly also
contributed to this process by side-lining the United Democratic Front (UDF)-
affiliated anti-racist lobby of the western Cape soon after its unbanning and
directly soliciting Coloured support. Given the continued prevalence of racial
thinking in post-apartheid South Africa, no political party aspiring to mass support
could afford to ignore the popular mindset in this regard.
A concomitant influence promoting innovation in the expression of Coloured
identity is that the abolition of apartheid and the advent of the democratic order
have provided Coloured people with a degree of personal liberty and freedom of
association never before enjoyed. One aspect of this new-found freedom is that
people now have the option of expressing their social identities and ethnic
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preferences in whichever way they please. A few organic intellectuals within the
community have, for example, sought to mobilise Coloured opinion primarily
through an identification with a slave past, others are trying to re-invent a Khoisan
ethnic identity and yet others retreat into a laager of Coloured exclusivism. Some
Coloured people have sought to promote an identification with Africa, others with
various forms of rainbow nationalism, while a few adhere to an anti-racist
universalism. Since 1994 there has developed a motley market-place for ideas and
movements around Coloured identity with a distinctly idiosyncratic element that
includes the eccentric claims of Chief Joseph Little to the chieftainship of the
Hamcumqua Khoi tribe, the suggestion that a ‘gangster party’5 be formed, the
provocatively named Kleurling Weerstandbeweging (Coloured Resistance
Movement)6 that drew most of its support in the Coloured townships of Gauteng
and the solitary effort of maverick, Peter Abrahams, who styles himself as
‘Instigator’ of the Movement for the Expulsion of Non-Blacks. The majority,
however, particularly within the working classes, has continued to adhere to a
racialised conception of Colouredness with strong affinities to whiteness and a
defensive racism toward Africans which draws heavily on apartheid values. This
new creativity in manifestations of Coloured identity is part of a wider flowering
of cultural expression encouraged by the tolerant atmosphere of post-apartheid
South Africa that self-consciously celebrates racial and cultural diversity.
It is ironic that with the abolition of legally binding race classification as
enshrined in the Population Registration Act and other apartheid legislation,7
Coloured identity has gained even greater salience in South African public life
than it had in the latter phases of the apartheid era. Now that those who had
forcibly been classified ‘Coloured’ were at liberty to identify socially and
politically in whichever way they desired, the majority have chosen to emphasise
their Colouredness and many have done so in ways that are hostile to Africans and
at times flagrantly racist. Such anti-African sentiment has surfaced most strongly
at election time, fanned by opposition-party rhetoric and a voyeuristic press. The
oft-heard dismissal of Mandela as ‘just another kaffir’ during the first years of
democratic rule captures the racially motivated contempt and alienation felt within
large swathes of the Coloured working classes towards the new order. The
subsequent emergence of the colloquial acronym ‘JACK’, an abbreviation for ‘just
another confused Kaffir’, reserved usually for the scornful dismissal of prominent
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Africans, particularly politicians or government spokesmen, is an indication that
these sentiments are still common.
A principal contributor to Coloured dissatisfaction with the new order and
thus an important determinant of the way the identity has found expression is that
the Coloured community, especially the working classes, see themselves as having
gained little, if any, tangible benefit from the new dispensation. While the skilled
and well-educated Coloured middle classes have profited from the extension of
civil liberties, and many have been able to take advantage of opportunities that
have become available to formerly disadvantaged people through affirmative
action and black economic empowerment initiatives, the Coloured working classes
have been victims of jobless economic growth and an increasing desire among
employers in the formal sector to hire Africans in order to have a more racially
representative work force. In the Western Cape the unwinding of distortions
caused by the Coloured Labour Preference Policy is not only affecting the
Coloured community adversely, but is also perceived to be the result of govern-
ment policy unfairly advantaging Africans. Civil rights such as the franchise and
freedoms of expression and association which have clearly enhanced the lives of
the Coloured middle classes have meant little to their working-class counterparts
who remain mired in poverty and feel marginalised. Having the right to live where
you choose, marry whom you wish and send your children to the school of your
choice is of little consequence to the labouring poor of the Coloured townships.
It also needs to be taken into account that while large sections of the African
poor have benefited from the provision of basic services, such as electricity,
sanitation and running water, a relatively small section of the Coloured proletariat
has experienced this sort of improvement in living standards. Coloured peoples’
status of relative privilege under white domination ensured that the apartheid
regime had, by and large, provided these services to Coloured communities and
in dormitory suburbs erected to house the hundreds of thousands of people
relocated under the Group Areas Act. Very importantly, the extension of social
services and welfare payments to the African masses neglected under apartheid
have in most cases meant a dilution in benefits from the relatively privileged levels
to which Coloured recipients had become accustomed. This has caused real
hardship within the Coloured proletariat and is generally seen to be the result of
inequitable government policies favouring Africans. Some have even chosen to
interpret government policy in this regard to be punishment of Coloured people
for not supporting the ANC. Though such claims are clearly unfounded, they
nevertheless feed Coloured suspicion of the ANC government as well as
resentment toward Africans in general.
Indeed, a very common perception within the Coloured working classes as
well as elements within the lower middle-income group is that they are worse off
under the new dispensation than they were under apartheid. They cite shrinking
employment opportunities, especially as a result of affirmative action, escalating
crime, deteriorating social services and the rapaciousness of corrupt government
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officials, among other reasons, to support the view that ‘we were better off under
the white man’. There is a strong feeling that the Coloured people have traded one
set of oppressors under apartheid for a larger, even more unscrupulous set of
oppressors after 1994. Relying on apartheid-style reasoning, disaffected Coloured
people often present themselves as victims of inherent racial traits of Africans, be
it their propensity for violence, their innate corruptness or an in-born tendency to
favour their own kind. Award-winning Coloured actor, Anthony Wilson, recently
captured popular sentiment within the Coloured community when he claimed:
The Boers stole, but at least they budgeted and did not steal everything. They stole the
cream, but the darkies are stealing the cream, the milk and the bucket. … We [coloureds]
are being victimised. We are being turned into the new slaves of our country. … We
swapped five million farmers for 34 million blacks [as our oppressors].8
While it is all too easy to dismiss such negativity toward the new South
Africa as a product of irrational racism, there is a growing body of evidence that
the living standards of the Coloured proletariat have suffered significantly since
the early 1990s. A study by Stellenbosch University economists, Servaas van der
Berg and Megan Louw, have found that while the poverty headcount ratios of all
race groups have declined between 1990 and 2000, only among Coloureds has it
increased during this period.9 Their growing impoverishment has manifested itself
in various ways within the Coloured working class. Not surprisingly, more and
more people within this social category have found it increasingly difficult to keep
up with escalations in the cost of municipal services as apartheid-era subsidies
were phased out and the ANC government implemented a policy of full-cost
recovery for such services. On the basis of a national survey conducted in
collaboration with the Human Sciences Research Council, David McDonald,
Director of the Development Studies Programme at Queens University, Canada,
found that twenty per cent of Coloured respondents were regularly unable to pay
for basic services such as water and electricity, and that many had suffered service
cut-offs or even eviction as a result. Even people in lower middle-income groups
were not immune to service delivery cut-offs. Having committed a large portion
of their income to mortgage or rent payments, they were unable to afford all the
services they needed.10 Another important indicator of social stress is that crime
statistics show a hugely disproportionate rise in the homicide rate among Coloured
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people from the early 1990s onwards, and that Coloured people are more than
twice as likely to be murdered as people of other races. While partly a legacy of
the breakdown of communal and family bonds as a result of forced removals, this
violence has in recent years been exacerbated by rising unemployment, increasing
drug and alcohol abuse, and a growing prevalence of gangsterism and criminal
activity in working-class Coloured areas.11 Whatever else one may read into these
studies and statistics, what is clear is that there is some material basis to Coloured
disenchantment with the new order and thus to racial antagonism towards
Africans.
In the wake of the 1994 elections, a stereotype of Coloured people as
particularly prone to racist behaviour has emerged. Given the continued
prevalence of racial thinking and stereotyping and of inter-racial hostility between
various groups in South African society, there is no justification for singling out
Coloured people in this regard, and any suggestion that their attitude is somehow
inherent is indefensible. What can, however, be said is that the Coloured
community is highly sensitive to issues of race. This sensitivity emanates, firstly,
from their marginality which has made them vulnerable in a society in which race
remains the primary form of social identification and therefore of social and
political solidarity. Secondly, their intermediate position in the racial hierarchy has
helped sharpen Coloured peoples’ awareness of racial issues which affect them
both personally and as a group. It needs to be stressed, though, that Coloured racial
hostility towards Africans is essentially defensive in nature and arises from their
position of weakness and feelings of vulnerability. This is a key reason why these
antagonisms have not yet spilt over into a single instance of serious inter-racial
violence. Such racial animosity has hitherto been restricted to the trading of verbal
insults and at worst has resulted in tense stand-offs over African squatter invasions
of land or houses which a particular Coloured community regarded as theirs.
Coloured feelings of marginality – and of betrayal amongst some disillu-
sioned former supporters of the anti-apartheid movement – have been deepened
by a perceived loss of status by Coloured people in the new South Africa. Having
all along enjoyed a position of relative privilege, many now regard Coloureds to
be the lowest in the pecking order of the new South Africa, because the African-
dominated government advantages its own racial constituency, while whites who
continue to dominate the economy increasingly favour Africans to ingratiate
themselves with the political elite. This highly selective view, which ignores the
impoverished mass of Africans, tends to dwell on high-profiled African
individuals and a rapidly growing and conspicuous African middle class for
justification. There can be little doubt that Coloured anxieties have been
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exacerbated by ongoing African racial chauvism toward Coloured people and an
African triumphalism that on occasion emanates from within the ranks of the ANC
itself. Coloured unease has also not been calmed by the shift in emphasis from
reconciliation under the Mandela presidency to the more Africanist tone of Thabo
Mbeki’s tenure.
Perhaps the most fundamental reason behind the need for Coloured identity
to find new forms of expression is that the discrediting of racist ideologies and the
abolition of apartheid have undermined the racial basis upon which the identity has
operated from the time of its late nineteenth century genesis. Colouredness has
always been constructed as a racial identity in the popular mind – and in much of
academic writing, one might add – and was sustained by racist ideology. There can
be little doubt that the driving force behind Coloured exclusivism under white rule
was the promotion and protection of the relative privilege enjoyed by Coloured
people in the South African racial hierarchy. The assertion of a separate Coloured
identity was originally founded on a claim to higher social status and better
treatment than Africans on the basis of their being assimilated into Western culture
and being partly descended from European colonists. Unable to achieve the first
prize of assimilating into the dominant society because of white racism, the second
prize of laying claim to an intermediate status in the racial system became the
mainstay of the espousal of a separate Coloured identity. The white supremacist
state and the ruling establishment by and large sanctioned this claim to relative
privilege because it resonated strongly with the dominant society’s perception of
what the social order should be, whether viewed as God-given or natural.
Privileging Coloureds above Africans was also useful as part of a broader divide-
and-rule strategy.
The precipitate change in the political and moral climate in which Coloured-
ness has to operate in the new South Africa has been deeply disconcerting to a
large part of its political, communal and intellectual leadership which has been
wrestling with the unenviable problem of re-orientating and re-articulating a
profoundly racialised identity which, in addition, is compromised by a widely
perceived complicity in maintaining white supremacy. The new order, with its
emphasis on multi-culturalism, nation-building and the egalitarian values
enshrined in its proudly progressive constitution, has invalidated what had all
along been the principal strategy behind the espousal of a separate Coloured
identity in white supremacist South Africa. With its racially based claim to relative
privilege no longer acceptable, there has been an urgent need by politicians,
community leaders and organic intellectuals to find a new basis for the espousal
of the identity and new strategies for fostering Coloured group interests.
One possible response to the post-apartheid situation has been the assertion
of non-racism. This option in its purist, anti-racist form has declined markedly in
popularity from its apogee in the heady days of the late 1980s when the anti-
apartheid movement, most notably the UDF, had considerable success in
promoting it to counter apartheid ideology. In the polarised world of apartheid
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South Africa, it was relatively easy to promote non-racism as an ideal. This has
become much more difficult in the post-apartheid environment, where racial and
ethnic identities have greater legitimacy. Despite the political correctness and
rainbow rhetoric that veneers much of South African public life, the reality of
racial politics in day-to-day living and the pervasiveness of racial forms of
thinking have made non-racism an impractical option for those seeking to mobilise
popular support. In the new South Africa the terrain of anti-racism appears largely
to have been abandoned to intellectuals and some former anti-apartheid activists
who continue to reject Colouredness as a form of false consciousness or white-
imposed identification.12
Since the reality of Coloured identity cannot be wished away or ignored in
the political arena or other areas of public life, a more practical alternative to the
strictly non-racial position has therefore become necessary for those wishing to
steer expressions of Coloured identity in a more progressive direction. The most
common response in this regard has been for organic intellectuals, community
leaders and activists within the Coloured community to espouse a rainbowist
position that accepts the reality of racial and ethnic distinctions and their identity
as Coloured but that embraces the multi-culturalist precepts that all communities
be accorded respect and receive equal treatment. Support of the ANC, generally
viewed as the most representative and progressive party, appears to be the most
popular political option among those who have adopted this stance.
An early example of an attempt to affirm Coloured identity and re-align it
within a progressive, multi-culturalist framework is provided by the December 1st
Movement which came into being in Cape Town in the latter months of 1996. The
Movement, which drew its name from the freeing of slaves on this day in 1834,
sought to invigorate a despondent and disunited Coloured community by kindling
within it an identification with a common slave past. Finding little resonance
among the mass of Coloured people and widely criticised for fostering Coloured
separatism, the Movement was allowed to lapse after its first commemorative
gathering on 1 December 1996. This initiative foundered on the contradiction of
its desire to maintain a politically progressive approach while mobilising under the
aegis of a discredited racial identity.13 A personal and more subtle attempt to come
to terms with the racial baggage of Coloured identity is furnished by Zimitri
Erasmus’s introduction to the edited collection of essays Coloured by History,
Shaped by Place, published in 2001. Erasmus argues that the only way to rupture
the racialised modes of thought in which the identity is mired is to confront the
reality of Coloured racism and its complicity with white supremacism head-on.
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Any form of denial or resort to essentialist notions of identity, as has been the case
since the advent of democracy, will only perpetuate Coloured marginality and
discomfort with the new dispensation. Most importantly, it is not only the
Coloured community, but the whole of South African society that will need to
develop a new mindset and a new kind of ‘reflexive political practice’ to relieve
itself of the burden of the apartheid past. All South Africans need to recognise
‘racist sentiments and practices as part of our everyday reality and the shaping of
all our selves’ and Coloured identity as part of a ‘shifting texture of broader black
experience’.14
For the greater majority of Coloured people, however, there are serious
drawbacks to broadly South Africanist approaches of the sort proposed by
Erasmus or the December 1st Movement. For many, racial thinking is so deeply
entrenched that racially unifying approaches to politics or inter-group relations are
automatically discounted as unrealistic, even delusional. Because of continued and
deep-seated antipathy towards Africans within the Coloured community and
perceptions of their being victimised by an African-dominated government, South
African political and economic life is seen as necessarily adversarial, with
cleavages drawn along racial lines. Even among those who profess to subscribe to
multi-cultural values, there is fear that Coloured interests and needs will be lost
sight of within any broadly South Africanist or non-racial outlook. Indeed, for
many, the marginalisation of Coloured people in the new South Africa is already
a reality. Rainbow nationalism has proven to be an arid ideology that is long on
rhetoric but short on practical solutions to racially defined problems of South
African political life. It has already become something of a clichè among Coloured
people to dismiss rainbowism with the protestation that ‘there is no brown in the
rainbow’.
Under these circumstances one might have expected Coloured separatism to
have had strong appeal, and for some organisation or movement professing
Coloured exclusivist ideals to have gained widespread popularity. The reality is
that initiatives such as the Kleurling Weerstandbeweging, the Brown Nationalist
Front, the Brown Democratic Party and the Coloured Forum have remained
completely marginal or have existed in name only. The only separatist movement
to have struck a chord within the Coloured community, and a relatively feeble one
at that, is Khoisan revivalism, the first high-profiled example being the Pan
Africanist Congress’s former secretary general, Benny Alexander’s, renunciation
in 1994 of his conventional name in favour of ‘Khoisan X’. The revivalist
movement reached its apogee when over 440 delegates representing 36 Khoisan
communities and organisations came together at the National Khoisan Consulta-
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tive Conference in Oudtshoorn between 29 March and 1 April 2001. The
movement has found scant support among the mass of Coloured people and there
has been little evidence of formal organisation between various Khoisan groupings
since then. Outside of the small number of people, largely in the Northern Cape,
that have all along regarded themselves as being of Khoisan descent, manifesta-
tions of Khoisan identity have been episodic and mainly in evidence on festive and
symbolic occasions such as Heritage Day celebrations and the return of the
remains of Sarah Baartman.
Khoisan revivalism is a movement only in the broadest sense of the term, as
there has over the past decade been a profusion of groups and individuals with a
variety of agendas who have claimed Khoisan identity. There also appears to be
a good deal of mutual antagonism between various revivalist groups and self-
proclaimed leaders or ‘chiefs’ who vie with each other for recognition and
ascendancy. Khoisan revivalism is in essence both exclusionist and Coloured
rejectionist. It is rejectionist in that Khoisan identity is proudly affirmed as an
authentic culture of ancient pedigree in place of Colouredness which is repudiated
as the coloniser’s perverted caricature of the colonised. It is exclusionist in that the
claim to being the true indigenes of South Africa, even when not articulated as a
demand for first-nation status, nevertheless represents a new argument for a
position of relative privilege. It is exclusionist in another sense as well, in that at
the Khoisan Consultative Conference there was general agreement that Muslims
and Malays did not qualify as being Khoisan.15
The overall sense one has regarding Coloured identity in the new South
Africa is one of fragmentation, uncertainty and confusion. Whereas for the greater
part of its existence Coloured identity was accepted as given by its bearers, and
while in the latter phases of the apartheid era the emergence of a rejectionist
movement created a schism between those who accepted and those who eschewed
it, the new South Africa has witnessed the emergence of a wide spectrum of
positions on the nature of Colouredness and a plethora of initiatives to change or
influence the ways in which it is expressed. Such attempts have thus far failed to
have much of a popular impact because they lack resonance with the Coloured
masses and are driven by small groups of intellectuals and community activists
with limited influence. 
The evidence indicates that many people who have gone beyond simply
accepting racial categories as given are wrestling with questions of to what extent
they should express their identity as black, as African, as South African, as
Coloured, as Khoisan, as descendants of slaves, or to make a stand on the principle
of non-racism. There is often confusion about whether Colouredness is inherent
or imposed from outside, whether it is something negative and to be discarded or
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something positive and to be embraced and affirmed. The identity is in flux and
is undergoing a degree of change last experienced with its emergence in the late
nineteenth century.
